<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<rss version="2.0">
	<channel>
		<title><![CDATA[ Information Security, IET - new TOC ]]></title>
		<link>http://ieeexplore.ieee.org</link>
		<description>TOC Alert for Publication# 4149673 </description>
		<year>2009</year>
		<month>June     </month>
		<day>19</day>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Unified dual-field multiplier in GF(P) and GF(2<sup>k</sup>)]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066980]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[A scalable unified multiplier for both prime fields GF(P) and binary extension fields GF(2<sup>k</sup>), where P = 2<sup>m</sup> 2 - 1 and GF(2<sup>k</sup>) is generated by an irreducible all one polynomial. The proposed unified dual-field multiplier uses the LSB-first bit-serial architecture for multiplication in GF(P) and GF(2<sup>k</sup>) other than the Montgomery multiplication algorithm, which has been employed by most existing dual-field multipliers. The proposed unified dual-field multiplier costs little space and time complexities. The new multiplier is scalable for operands of any size while other existing dual-field multipliers are only scalable for operands with multiples of m. Furthermore, the proposed multiplier has simplicity, regularity, modularity and concurrency and is very suitable to be implement in VLSI.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[June  2009]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066980]]></guid>
			<volume>3</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>45</startPage>
			<endPage>52</endPage>
			<fileSize>176</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Chiou, C.W.;Lee, C.-Y.;Lin, J.-M.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Signature scheme based on the root extraction problem over braid groups]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066981]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Several public key cryptosystems and authentication schemes based on the conjugator search and root extraction problems over braid groups have been proposed. However, security analysis showed that it is not necessary to solve the underlying conjugator search problem or the root extraction problem in order to break these public key cryptographic algorithms. Hence, these cryptographic primitives suffer from some security drawbacks. A digital signature scheme based on the root extraction problem over braid groups is proposed. It is proven that the only way for the attacker to forge a signature is to extract the eth root for a given braid in the braid group. It is also shown that given sufficiently many message-signature pairs, the attacker needs to solve an intractable problem, the group factorisation problem, in order to forge a signature. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the attacker cannot learn much useful information by reconstructing braid equations with respect to the public and secret keys. Performance analysis shows that the proposed signature scheme is efficient and practical, and the key sizes are acceptable. The computational overheads to sign a message and to verify a signature are only equivalent to several 1024-RSA modular multiplications.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[June  2009]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066981]]></guid>
			<volume>3</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>53</startPage>
			<endPage>59</endPage>
			<fileSize>177</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Wang, B.-C.;Hu, Y.-P.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Alternative to the karatsuba algorithm for software implementations of GF(2<sub>n</sup>) multiplications]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066982]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[A new approach to subquadratic space complexity GF(2<sup>n</sup>) multipliers has been proposed recently. The corresponding algorithm for software implementations is developed. While its recursive implementation is as simple as that of the Karatsuba algorithm, it requires much less memory to store the look-up table. Therefore it is quite suitable for memory-constrained applications, for example smart cards.]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[June  2009]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066982]]></guid>
			<volume>3</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>60</startPage>
			<endPage>65</endPage>
			<fileSize>154</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Fan, H.;Hasan, M.A.;]]></authors>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Heuristic guess-and-determine attacks on stream ciphers]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066983]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[Guess-and-determine (GD) attacks are general attacks on stream ciphers, which have often been implemented in an ad hoc manner. The authors introduce a heuristic approach to the design of GD attacks, that is a dynamic programming method using a Viterbi-like algorithm which is a well-known decoding algorithm for convolutional codes. The authors also show that with this method, the resulting GD attacks, named heuristic GD (HGD) attacks, on TIPSY, SNOW1 and SNOW2 lead to less computational complexity than the previously known GD attacks. The main advantage of HGD attacks, over ad hoc GD attacks, is that while being powerful, they can be designed algorithmically for classes of stream ciphers, holding a certain condition. Using this method, the authors examine the resistance of SOSEMANUK, a word-oriented stream cipher proposed for the Ecrypt Stream Cipher Project. The complexity of the designed GD attack, O(<sup>2224</sup>), is much less than the complexity of exhaustive search attack on the internal state, O(<sup>2384</sup>), but larger than the claimed security level, that is O(2128).]]></description>
			<pubDate><![CDATA[June  2009]]></pubDate>
			<guid><![CDATA[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?isnumber=5066979&arnumber=5066983]]></guid>
			<volume>3</volume>
			<issue>2</issue>
			<startPage>66</startPage>
			<endPage>73</endPage>
			<fileSize>228</fileSize>
			<authors><![CDATA[Ahmadi, H.;Eghlidos, T.;]]></authors>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>